Slow Violence, Law, and History by Hay, Doug
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
All Papers Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
6-2013
Slow Violence, Law, and History
Doug Hay
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, dhay@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers
Part of the Legal History Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Papers by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Repository Citation
Hay, Doug, "Slow Violence, Law, and History" (2013). All Papers. 318.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/318
  
 
Slow violence, law, and history 
Doug Hay 
I read Rob Nixon’s engrossing and appalling book from the perspective of an historian who 
works on law. It opened to me an immense range of scholarship and activism of which I was 
only tangentially aware. But it also has themes that resonated, on almost every page, with things 
I study. Law certainly appears in the book. Here I want here to emphasize its importance to his 
argument, and to widen the discussion of chronologies.  
Time 
Nixon discusses the destruction and activism and literature of recent decades, and at the other 
extreme, the deep environmental time of climate change, fossil fuel creation, the 4.5 billion year 
half life of depleted uranium. The disjunction of temporal orders, of chronologies or 
chronotypes, is a main theme of his book (61 and passim).  In these remarks I want to look at the 
mid-range: the early modern/modern period of the 16th to early 20th centuries.  Humanity lacked 
the capacity for purely technological destruction at the beginning of this period (suffering rather 
the biological destruction of the Black Death spread by human commerce—the plague destroyed 
one-third to one-half the population of England in the 14th century, and returned repeatedly into 
the 1600s).  But by the 18th century the groundwork of modernity was being surely laid. Today’s 
neoliberalism is a reprise of classical 18th-century liberalism in markets—and  globalization is a 
reprise of 19th century globalization in the century before 1914. (After the world wars and 
depression, world trade only recovered to 1914 levels again in the 1980s ).  It was in the 18th and 
19th centuries that law, in particular, prepared the way for destruction of lands and peoples by the 
powerful.  Because law is the rhetorical and instrumental mode by which the powerful both 
justify and enact their predations. Because law is the principal creation of the state, and the mode 
of state power—they are coeval—his emphasis on the importance of the state (p.141) is amply 
justified.   
State Law 
 Over the last two centuries, state law in England and America radically redefined human beings’ 
relationship to their landscapes, removed all legal recourse against the employer for industrial 
injury in order to ensure corporate profitability, degraded legal rights to water and air quality in 
order to accommodate and foster industrial development, and created empires of law as well as 
of capital to export all these legal inventions to their colonized subjects.  What we see in the last 
thirty years is what can be traced over the last 200; intensified, no doubt, as technological danger 
and military force have become greater, but facilitated and obscured by legal inventions well 
over a century old. Common law, the law of the great British and American empires of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rests on past authority. And a century, in law, is easily long 
enough to count as tradition, precedent, the authoritative past.   
Nixon’s emphasis on the occult characteristics of slow violence resonates very strongly for me as 
a social historian of law, because the common law has been an elite jargon, an immensely 
complicated social and intellectual structure, from its beginnings.  Revolutionaries in every 
century, including levelers and fifth monarchy millenarians in the 17th century, called for a 
single, simple law book and the elimination of the lawyers: justice should be clear and open, not 
hidden by tortuous language and intricate procedures navigable only by the legal priests who 
served the upper classes. (Veall; cf Nixon 125) Those who demanded popular justice were right.  
The common law,  the forum within which the most wealthy increasingly conducted their 
quarrels rather than through directed violence, was also, from its beginnings, the instrument by 
which the great and powerful obfuscated and legitimated the extraction of wealth from the rest of 
the community.  
On a wider scale, the early-modern period of early imperial expansion generated even more raw 
expressions of legal power. State law in the special form of the law of states—international law-- 
legitimated destruction of  ‘savage’ and ‘uncivilized’ populations, and the rejection of their 
claims to rights against harm, rights slowly being built up, under wider voting franchises, in the 
metropoles of the empires in the nineteenth century.   
I return to empire below.  But first I want to signal an important development in England: a 
century or more of legal destruction of older rights that had characterized ancient agriculture and 
social practice.  
 
Local law and environmentalism 
It was a fiction of the common law, the law of the judges, that it was a summary of popular legal 
custom from pre-medieval times. The common law was in fact the custom of the judges, who 
created a common set of doctrines for England suited to litigation among a tiny upper class.  But 
some custom remained important until about 1800 in the form of special divergent local customs, 
which regulated the use of land by the owners and occupiers of individual manors, usually 
several hundred people. Manorial custom (and there were perhaps 10,000 manors in England) 
differed from manor to manor in terms of inheritance rights, occupancy rights, and especially 
(my point here) the regulation of use rights over others’ lands: common of pasture, common of 
turbary, common of estover, gleaning, and others. The right to pasture one’s cattle on others’ 
land after harvest or on a common waste; to take turves for fuel; to take fallen wood for fuel or 
building; and the right of the poor inhabitants to glean the land for fallen grain after the 
harvest—all were regulated by juries of local small and medium owners, enforced by local 
officials. So too was what was planted and harvested; how ditches were to be cleaned and when; 
and a host of other communal concerns in the great open fields. This intimacy with land and its 
regulation created the rhythms of peasant life—the traditions of the dead, passed on by custom 
rather than literacy (Nixon 94-5, 162)-- celebrated by John Berger :  knowledge of land, 
landscape, living from the land, replenishing and preserving the land. These were the great 
historical commons of early-modern England and Europe (Neeson). They disappeared with 
enclosure—first, by agreement of larger landowners in the 1600s; massively in the later 1700s 
and early 1800s by coercive legislation, laws enacted by a parliament of great landlords who 
counted agreement by acres rather than voices. Their argument was that enclosure would lead to 
higher yields (and higher rents to them). Many historians think of enclosure in terms of the 
changes in land use, the disappearance of open fields in which several property was combined 
with communal common uses.  But for legal historians, enclosure is no more and no less than the 
legislative elimination of local custom that formerly had had the force of law, both for the local 
community, and even in the courts of the state. 
 After more than a century of complacent scholarly agreement with the enclosers’ claims for 
increased productivity, the productivity of open-field agriculture has been shown by recent 
research to be as high as enclosed property in severalty  (Allen). Only one manor remains 
unenclosed in England, as a museum, although Margaret Thatcher tried to enclose it as an affront 
to ‘freedom’. But students of modern commons of various kinds in other countries and in the 
world’s seas, led by Elinor Ostrom, who unexpectedly received a Nobel Prize in economics for 
her findings--have showed that community regulation of commons works, preserving the 
resources, preserving livelihoods and communities.  State control and regulation does not. 
(Ostrom et al.)  Partly that is because state bureaucrats are ignorant of how commons work; more 
often it is because the state is where kleptocracy is organized and legalized—where the rich, as 
in Kenya, try to seize community resources for their private use.   
Corporations 
The corporation in common law countries is a legal invention of the 1600s, specifically designed 
to exploit colonial possessions (the East India Company, the Africa Company, the Hudson Bay 
Company…)  In the colonies where it operated (and created—cf India) the superprofits were 
immense, the spoliation of communities often devastating. By the mid-19th century rights of 
incorporation, hitherto jealously opposed as an invitation to fraud in England and America 
themselves, were granted to all applicants in those countries.  Ever since then, the perpetrators of 
environmental catastrophes, whether sudden and dramatic, or slow and insidious, have hidden 
behind the corporate form. The corporate oppressors of labour (see below) did so also. They still 
do (Glasbeek).  Their predations among poor peoples world wide is one more turn in a cycle of 
globalization (more accurately imperialism) that was perfected by lawyers, administrators and 
statesmen of the west in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.  
Empire 
The transnational corporation (Dutch and English East India Companies, and all their successors) 
is entwined in the purposes of empire, and the dominant organizing American empire of the 20th-
century bears many resemblances to the British empire--  in its covert legal means and its overt 
legal justifications. Because law is essential to empire, to resource wars, to expropriation of land, 
to the creation of exploited labour.     
Legal justification of empire:  
The epithet ‘rule of law’ has been often used to epitomize all the cultural/material justifications 
offered by the apologists of both empires: bringing civilization and Christianity and economic 
progress to British imperial subjects; bringing honesty, transparency and economic progress to 
American imperial subjects. ‘Rule of law’, whatever it might mean in London, in the case of the 
British Empire was an empty shibboleth. Englishmen in India could not be subject to Indian 
courts and judges; Irish parliamentarians could not enact laws in Dublin that had not been pre-
approved in London; in Crown colonies, no local legislature would be tolerated; often where 
such legislatures existed, as in the West Indies, only European settlers and planters, not the 
indigenous peoples or the imported African and Indian labour, had representation; many British 
colonies, including the largest, India, were under almost continuous emergency legislation that 
suspended or prohibited entirely recourse to habeas corpus until independence (and, 
unfortunately, afterwards); everywhere (including conquered white colonies like Quebec) 
resistance was met by dentention without trial, deportation, censorship of the press, execution of 
indigenous or ex-slave leaders (Ireland 1798, Guyana 1823, Jamaica 1824, Jamaica 1833, 
Canada 1837, Ceylon 1848, India 1857, Jamaica 1865, south Africa 1901, India 1919—there 
have been many eloquent although illiterate Saro-Wiwas) and (when necessary) the extremities 
of martial law. In the 20th century whole areas were carved out, exempt from any pretence of 
law: the aerial bombing of Afghani tribes in the 1920s, for example, approved by enthusiastic 
imperialists like Churchill. (Simpson; cf Nixon    ) As scholars of international law have argued, 
the very notion of law for distant peoples was not part of the European state system of 
international law: the ‘uncivilized’ could not be considered part of civilized humanity, and the 
law of nation states (Bowden). For particularly troublesome resistant populations in India the 
British enacted the Criminal Tribes Acts (the first was written by James Fitzjames Stephen, who 
wrote much of our Canadian Criminal Code, as well as the Indian Penal Code.) The Criminal 
Tribes Acts allowed the state not only to displace whole populations but to use them as forced 
labour on public works, and the continued coercion of such peoples did not end with 
independence, as Nixon notes (163-4).   
    From the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth, when British suppression of mau mau in 
Kenya (1952-56 )  used terror, mass execution, and vast concentration camps to maintain the 
colonial regime that had seized land and reduced peoples to coerced labourers, British 
imperialism scorned ‘rule of law’ for subject peoples of colour. But they maintained its façade 
through rhetoric and guile, and here Nixon’s emphasis on the occult is particularly apt: the facts 
of the mau mau repression have only recently come to light (Anderson, Elkins; Blacker; cf Nixon 
137ff).  Information about the Kenyan atrocities the British public might not have ignored were 
deliberately suppressed by the state. As Nixon puts it, memory loss is often memory repression.  
Thus ‘writing as scripted obliteration’ (p.95) aptly characterizes Niall Ferguson’s celebration of 
the glories of the British Empire. The historian Bernard Porter notes that Ferguson also 
celebrates his idyllic childhood memories of Kenya, a few years after the British atrocities 
committed against the Kikuyu. He says nothing about it. Empires demand amnesia.   
Legal facilitation of empire: 
Behind the façade of ‘rule of law’ lay the coercive, facilitative machinery of legal form, 
legislative terms, judicial interpretation and punitive enforcement.  We could examine the role of 
the corporate form, the deliberate absence of environmental regulation, or the huge legislative 
corpus and police forces that constructed taxation schemes and land appropriation schemes, new 
enclosures, to ‘free’ landscapes of  people and to construct the inputs of land and labour (South 
Africa enacted more laws than any other historical regime, bar Nazi Germany).  All this 
recapitulated on a world scale the early-modern history of English capitalism, and the laws used 
in colonial settings were copies of English law, but often far more punitive.   
One example: the contract of employment, arguably the single most important (certainly most 
numerous) kind of contract. Slavery, the form labour took in the British Caribbean, in Mauritius, 
in Assam, and  other spectacularly profitable British plantation colonies of the 18th century, was 
of course a matter of law: its quotidien lawful punishments draconian, its denial of equality 
before the law absolute, even when emergency martial law was not being used to suppress slave 
revolts, and even after London began enacting ameliorative legislation (inspectors of slaves, 
limits on flogging) in the 1820s.  After the abolition of slavery in 1834, throughout the empire 
local versions of  employment contracts, master and servant law, enforced by new prisons and 
police forces, replaced the legal structures of slavery.  Police, vagrancy, passes (cf Nixon 95-96 
on the Bedouin) while most notorious in South Africa (Nixon 190), were invented in early-
modern English vagrancy and master and servant law, and most fully developed in the West 
Indies and many other colonial jurisdictions, first under slavery, then with ‘free’ labour.  
English master and servant law was coercive from its beginnings in 1349. It only ceased to be 
enforced by penal (criminal) sanctions in Britain in 1867/1875 (imprisonment of the worker for 
breach of contracted abolished, followed by the end of  penal fines.) Meanwhile, in the growing 
Empire, a vast legal/administrative apparatus of coerced ‘free’ labour replaced slavery. It was 
created, disciplined, and oppressed for profit through the state enforcement of highly exploitative 
contracts of employment. Under indenture, vast numbers of workers, both willing and coerced, 
signed contracts to labour in unknown conditions at the other side of the world—they came 
primarily from India, and went primarily to the British Caribbean, to Africa, to Mauritius. But 
also from Pacific Islands to Queensland, and many other local variants, including within India 
itself. Peasants were remade into labourers. Law constructed their working conditions as highly 
coercive, with employers often given rights to discipline and punish  that only magistrates could 
exercise in England, and with a huge recourse to flogging, deduction of wages, mandatory 
increased lengths of contracts to punish absenteeism, and the deliberate creation of perpetual 
debt. (referred to in Nixon, 71, 83; cf Hay and Craven) 
Imperial master and servant law was thus similar to, and based on, English employment contract 
law, but far more punitive, with a massive advantage granted to employers. Ex-slave colonies 
were  particularly notable in this regard, but the terms of this mass of legislation (over 2,000 
enactments in over 100 colonies) was approved by London (which had the power of 
disallowance). Indeed, as ‘scientific racism’ increasingly informed the bureaucrats of an ever-
widening empire in the later 19th century, the minimal protections for workers (such as limits on 
the legal length of contracts) were progressively removed. Only the collapse of world trade in the 
early 20th century, and pressure from the ILO, persuaded London to repeal the most egregiously 
exploitative elements of master and servant law in their colonial possessions.   
Now 
But that was at the end of one period of imperial expansion.  A new one was well underway by 
the 1930s. The ILO campaign against British imperial master and servant law was in part an 
American-inspired attempt to undermine British imperial power.  The new world empire was 
being created. Since the second world  war, renewed globalization, renewed neoclassical 
economics, vastly increased weaponry, deeper environmental degradation, accelerating global 
inequality among ever-larger populations, and selfish complacency among elites and 
governments, have a terrible urgency.  Nixon’s book is a wonderful response, a hopeful sign of 
the power of intelligence, of writing, of activism.  
11 June 2013 
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